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Abstract
This paper provides an empirical investigation on the discrepancies between official
exchange rate regimes and de facto exchange rate policies in transition economies.
Since official and de facto regime choices are not independent of each other, we adopt a
bivariate probit model to describe the joint determination of the two regime choices. After
finding the important determinants of both regime choices, we use a univariate probit
model to describe the determination of regime discrepancies. We find that errors in the
selection of official regimes as well as the macroeconomic developments calling for
conflicting adjustments in exchange rate regimes are important determinants of regime
discrepancies.
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The choice of the appropriate exchange rate regime for open economies is a venerable
topic in international macro economics and finance. Early literature, based on the
seminal works on optimal currency areas (OCA) by Mundell, Kenen, and McKinnon,
stressed the usefulness of monetary policy to cope with aggregate demand shocks.
Following Poole's (1970) analysis of monetary policy instruments, subsequent authors
emphasized the type and source of the dominant shocks to which an economy is
exposed. The literature building on Barro and Gordon's (1983) work on monetary policy
credibility developed the idea that exchange rate pegs could help import credibility of low
inflation policies from a foreign central bank (e.g. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) and
von Hagen (1991)). Most recent literature warns against the instabilities arising from
combining exchange rate pegs with high capital mobility (e.g. Eichengreen (1994),
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), and Fischer (2001)). Following the collapse of the Bretton
Woods System in the early 1970s, a strand of empirical literature has explained
exchange rate regime choices and found some empirical support of these arguments.
1
Exchange rate regimes can be classified on two different grounds. One is the
“official” regime, i.e., the regime that national authorities annually declare to the IMF. The
other is the “de facto” regime. The de facto regime is the regime actually practiced by the
authorities. Until recently, the fact that the official and the de facto regimes are often
different has largely been ignored in the literature. However, as Calvo and Reinhart
(2000) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) have recently pointed out,
discrepancies between the official and the de facto regimes are not uncommon in
practice. De facto regimes may be characterized by more or less exchange rate volatility
than expected on the basis of official regimes, and these discrepancies may last for
substantial periods of time. As shown by Gosh et al. (1997), frequent adjustments of the
central parity can make an officially pegged exchange rate quite flexible. Calvo and
Reinhart (2000) show that many countries that officially adopt floating exchange rates
use frequent foreign exchange market interventions to maintain a high degree of
exchange rate stability, a phenomenon they call “fear of floating”.
Why countries choose to practice an exchange rate regime different from their
official one remains a puzzle in the literature. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) argue that low
credibility of the monetary authority is the main reason for fear of floating. By providing
the economy with a transparent and easily verifiable nominal anchor for inflation
expectations, stable exchange rates can help weak central banks to improve the2
credibility of their commitment to price stability. Lahiri and Végh (2000) suggest that
regime discrepancies result from a trade-off between the cost of foreign exchange
market intervention and real output losses due to exchange rate volatility. Their analysis
predicts that central banks allow the exchange rate to adjust to small shocks but
intervene in the presence of large shocks to avoid excessive exchange rate volatility.
Hausmann et al. (2000) explain regime discrepancies by the desire to avoid large
exchange rate volatility, which increases with a country’s borrowing in foreign currency.
At a closer look, however, these arguments contribute more to explaining the desirable
degree of exchange rate flexibility and, therefore, the choice of exchange rate regimes
than to explaining discrepancies between official and de facto regimes. Apart from
Holden et al. (1979) and Poirson (2001), existing empirical studies of exchange rate
regime choice have focused on official rather than de facto regimes.
2
The present paper takes a positive approach to explaining exchange rate regime
discrepancies. It presents an empirical analysis of official and de facto exchange rate
regime choices for a sample of 25 transition countries during the 1990s. This is an
interesting sample, because, not withstanding their economic heterogeneity, these
countries share a common history of emerging from socialist regimes largely isolated
from the world economy at the end of the 1980s, they all faced large macro economic
imbalances and stabilization problems initially, they all became gradually integrated into
international trade and financial markets during the period we consider. Yet, there is
quite a variety of exchange rate regimes, both official and de facto, among these
countries. In an earlier paper (von Hagen and Zhou (2002)) we have shown that the
official regime choices of these countries can be explained empirically on the basis of
standard arguments from international macro economics. Here, we extend Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger’s (2000) analysis to our sample. We show, first, that, similar to their
findings in a sample of industrialized and developing countries, regime discrepancies are
in fact quite common among the countries we consider. We then develop a bivariate
discrete-choice model explaining the joint determination of the official and the de facto
regimes. Our results indicate that the official regimes respond more significantly to
macro economic fundamentals such as openness and the commodity structure of
international trade, while the de facto regimes respond more strongly to variables
describing issues of macro economic stabilization such as inflation and budget deficits.
Finally, we develop a discrete choice model of regime discrepancies.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review
over the issues pertaining to de facto exchange rate regimes as well as to discrepancies
between de facto and official regimes. Section 3 presents a bivariate discrete choice
model for the joint regime determinations. Section 4 derives a univariate probit model
from the bivariate one and analyzes empirically the deviations between the official and
the de facto exchange rate regimes. Conclusions are collected in section 5.
2. Official and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes
2.1 Identification of the discrepancies between official and de facto regimes
Two recent papers identify the differences between the officially claimed exchange rate
regimes and the actually observed exchange rate policies. Calvo and Reinhart (2000)
analyze the behavior of exchange rates, reserves, monetary aggregates, interest rates,
and commodity prices for 154 exchange rate arrangements from 39 countries to assess
whether official labels on exchange rate regimes provide an adequate representation of
actual exchange rate policies.
3  Their main finding is that countries claiming to run free or
managed floats often intervene heavily in their foreign exchange markets to reduce
exchange rate volatility. As a result, their exchange rate volatility is similar to that
observed for countries that maintain official exchange rate pegs, and the volatility of
international reserves is larger than under true floating regimes.
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000), hereafter referred to as LYS, use cluster
analysis to classify de facto regimes. The basic idea is that fixed (flexible) regimes
should exhibit low (high) volatility in exchange rate movements but high (low) volatility in
international reserves. For intermediate regimes both volatility measures should lie
somewhere in the middle. Using cluster analysis  means that all volatilities are compared
to sample averages. This avoids the use of arbitrary standards of comparison, but the
resulting classifications are sample-dependent. As the LYS data has only 106
observations from 20 transition economies, we follow their guidelines to construct a
larger data set for 25 transition economies. We obtain 149 country-year observations
with data on all the three volatility measures: volatility of exchange rates, volatility of
exchange rate changes, and volatility of international reserves. We apply the same
cluster analysis as used by LYS to classify them into four regimes: fixed, intermediate,
flexible, or inconclusive.
4,5 The additional 54 country-year observations without data on
international reserve volatility are assigned to the regime with the shortest distance
between the data point and the cluster centroid based on the remaining two volatility4
measures. For a description of the data and the classification procedures see Appendix
I; the results of our  de facto classification are listed in Appendix II, Table A-2.
The classification based on our sample shows that there are clear differences in
the distribution of volatility measures among de facto regimes. As shown in Table 1, the
median value of the exchange rate volatility (ó(e), measured by the average absolute
monthly percentage change of the exchange rate) is below 1 percent for fixed regimes,
almost 3 percent for intermediate regimes, and above 8 percent for flexible regimes.
However, the volatility of reserves (ó(r), measured by the average absolute monthly
percentage change of international reserves), declines as exchange rate flexibility
increases, with 9.9, 6.1, and 4.7 percent for fixed, intermediate, and flexible regimes
respectively. Inconclusive regimes are characterized by low volatilities in both exchange
rate movements and reserve changes, while intermediate regimes always lie between
fixed and flexible regimes from every perspective. These findings, similar to those
reported by LYS, are consistent with our expectations on the behavior of exchange rates
and reserves under different exchange rate regimes.
Table 1:  Exchange Rate and Reserve Volatility in Transition Economies (in %)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ó(e)         ó(Äe)         ó(r)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fixed 1.92 0.97 2.37 0.99 10.62 9.86
Intermediate 4.84 2.89 5.98 3.46 10.02 6.10
Flexible 17.64 8.14 28.28 13.78 6.29 4.66
Inconclusive 0.63 0.58 0.78 0.80 2.99 3.28
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ó(e) is the measure for the volatility of exchange rates; ó(Äe) is the measure for the
volatility of exchange rate changes; ó(r) is the measure for the volatility of reserves. See
Appendix I for detailed definitions. A total of 149 country-year observations are classified into 13
inconclusive, 90 fixed, 27 intermediate, and 19 flexible regimes.
The de facto exchange rate regimes thus classified are then contrasted to the
official regimes to identify regime discrepancies. Here the official regimes refer to the
IMF classification, with dollarization, currency boards, and conventional fixed pegs
defined as fixed-rate regimes, horizontal bands, crawling pegs, and crawling bands as
intermediate regimes, and managed and independent floats as flexible regimes (see
Appendix II, Table A-1). Table 2 summarizes the main results with both LYS and our
classification of de facto regimes. LYS find that almost half of the 2188 country-year5
observations exhibit regime discrepancies. Discrepancies between official and de facto
regimes are pervasive. They include 20.4 percent cases of “fear of floating” and 28.5
percent cases in which the de-facto regime is more flexible than the official one. We call
this second discrepancy “fear of pegging”.
6  Among the 106 observations from transition
economies, LYS find that only 47 percent of the regime choices are consistent, one third
is of the fear of floating type, and 19.8 percent represent fear of pegging. These
estimates thus suggest that regime discrepancies are even more prevalent among
transition economies than among other countries.
Table 2: Discrepancies Between Official and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LYS: Full Sample   LYS:Transition  Current sample
countries
  # % # % # %
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fear of floating
1      447 20.4    35 33.0    102 51.8
Consistent
2          1118 51.1   50 47.2      75 38.1
Fear of pegging
3       623 28.5    21 19.8      20 10.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total                  2188 100.0  106 100.0  197 100.0
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] De facto exchange rate regimes are less flexible than official regimes.
[2] De facto and official exchange rate regimes are of the same degree of flexibility.
[3] De facto exchange rate regimes are more flexible than official regimes.
Compared to LYS, our sample contains more transition countries and more
recent years. While the standard of comparison LYS use to measure the consistency of
exchange rate regime choices is based on the average volatilities from all countries and
years in their sample, we use average volatilities only from the transition countries for
this purpose. We find an even smaller share of consistent choices in our sample. About
half of the countries in our group are characterized by “fear of floating”, while 10 percent
exhibit “fear of pegging”. Thus, our data confirm that regime discrepancies are a
common phenomenon. Like LYS, we find that transition economies are more prone to
fear of floating than to fear of pegging.
To explore the differences between official and de facto regimes, Table 3 reports
the average frequency and the average absolute size of regime changes for all transition
economies and for two sub-groups. The latter are based on an index equal to zero for
fixed-rate regimes, one for intermediate regimes, and two for flexible-rate regimes. The6
table shows that the average transition country changed its official regime less than half
as frequently than its de-facto regime. The average size of adjustment, however, is
larger in the case of the official regimes. Countries not aspiring EU membership in the
near future changed their official and de facto exchange rate regimes more frequently
and in bigger steps than the EU candidates.
Table 3: Average Frequency and Size of Regime Changes
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Official Regimes De Facto Regimes
Frequency Size Frequency Size
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Countries         1.40 1.55   3.08 1.28
EU Candidates 
a     1.10 1.20   2.60 1.11
Non-Accession     1.60 1.78   3.40 1.39
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: 
a Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia.
Table 4 considers persistence for official and de facto regimes over time. To
derive a measure of persistence, assume that regime choices over time follow a Markov
process, rt = Prt-1 + ut, where rt is a three-dimensional vector describing the distribution of
regime choices in period t, and P is a 3x3 matrix reporting the transition probabilities.
The diagonal elements of this matrix indicate the probability of staying in a given regime
for two consecutive periods. The table reports the empirical estimates of these elements.
Since we find that the transition matrix is non-stationary for the official regimes, we
report the estimates for 1991--1995 and 1996--1999 separately.
7 Table 4 indicates that
official regimes are considerably more persistent than de facto regimes. Only de-facto
fixed regimes exhibit a degree of persistence comparable to official regimes.





Sub-period: 1991-1995 0,60 1,00 0,88
Sub-period: 1996-1999   0,87 0,71 0,91
De Facto Regimes 0,74 0,22 0,42
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Persistence of a regime is measured by the probability of staying in the named
regime for two consecutive years.7
Similarly, we can compute the persistence of regime discrepancies based on the
corresponding transition matrix. Table 5 reports the results. Fear of floating is much
more persistent in our sample than both consistent combinations of official and de facto
regimes and fear of pegging.
8
Table 5: Persistence of Regime Discrepancies: 1991--1999
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fear of Pegging Consistent Fear of Floating
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   0,15 0,65 0,82
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Persistence of a regime discrepancy is measured by the probability of
staying in the named type of regime discrepancy (including no discrepancy)
for two consecutive years.
3. A Model of Exchange Rate Regime Choices
3.1. Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes
The optimal choice of exchange rate regimes is a topic with a long tradition in
international macro economics. Here, we briefly summarize the main arguments from
the literature. Building on Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) argues that small and open
economies are more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates than large and relatively closed
economies. Countries are also more likely to adopt flexible exchange rates, if their trade
is geographically diversified. Kenen (1969) suggests that countries with concentrated
production structures are more likely to adopt flexible exchange rates. In the empirical
analysis below, we represent these considerations by empirical measures of the degree
of openness of the economy (OPENNESS), geographical concentration of foreign trade
(GEOCON), and commodity concentration of foreign trade (COMCON).
9 We also
consider the degree of openness to the European Union (OPENTOEU), the leading
export market for many transition countries. We also use real GDP, expressed in logs, to
measure the size of the economy.
 10
The development of a country's financial sector is another, important factor
(McKinnon (1993) and Hausmann et al. (1999)). Countries with relatively undeveloped
financial sectors often opt for fixed exchange rates, because they lack the market
instruments to conduct domestic open market operations and because they wish to
shield their fledgling banking industries against large exchange rate movements.
 We use8
the ratio of broad money to GDP (MONEY) to approximate empirically the degree of
financial sector development.
Henderson (1979), McKinnon (1981), and Boyer (1978) argue that fixed
exchange rates yield better output stability in the presence of domestic nominal shocks,
while flexible rates perform better in the presence of real shocks. Models in the tradition
of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination, in contrast, focus on the
transmission of inflation between countries and the use of exchange rate policies to
achieve low inflation rates. Following Barro and Gordon (1983), numerous authors have
argued that countries whose monetary authorities suffer from low credibility of low-
inflation policies can import central bank credibility by adopting a fixed exchange rate
with a more stable currency (e.g., Fratianni and von Hagen (1992), Giavazzi and
Giovannini (1989), and Melitz (1988)). This view was particularly important in the early
years of the transition from a socialist to a market economy, when price liberalization
and the destruction of monetary overhangs inherited from past led to high inflation. We
use variables to proxy such considerations of stabilizing inflation in the empirical
analysis. The first is the annual rate of consumer price inflation (INFLATION).
11 The
second is the cumulative inflation differential of a country relative to a weighted average
of its five main trading partners (CUMINF). The third is an index of exchange rate pass-
through to domestic prices (PASSTHRU). For each year, this index measures the
correlation between monthly changes in consumer prices and monthly changes in the
nominal effective exchange rate lagged by one quarter. Hausmann et al. (2000) propose
this index as a measure of how much domestic price stability is affected by exchange
rate movements. Furthermore, we include the real GDP growth rate (GDPGROWTH).
Poor growth performance increases the incentive to ease monetary policy and let go off
an exchange rate constraint imposed to combat inflation.
In recent years, the general trend towards capital mobility has shifted attention to
the implications of capital movements for the choice of exchange rate regimes. Fixed
exchange rate regimes, when combined with a high degree of capital mobility, are
exposed to speculative attacks resulting from fundamental policy inconsistencies
(Krugman (1979)) or self-fulfilling expectations (Obstfeld (1996)). The lesson is that
countries should avoid unstable combinations of capital mobility and exchange rate fixity.
Important factors that reduce the risk of speculative attacks are the availability of foreign
currency reserves to defend a fixed exchange rate, and the consistency of macro
economic policies. Sustainability of public finances is a key factor in this regard. We9
select two variables to account for the risk of currency crisis in the empirical analysis.
The first is the ratio of non-gold international reserves to broad money (RESERVE), a
measure of the availability of international liquidity.
12 The other is the ratio of the
government fiscal budget balance to GDP (FISCAL), a proxy for the soundness of fiscal
fundamentals, which plays a crucial role in both first and second generation currency
crisis models.
Besides these variables, we also include a dummy variable for the membership
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), CISDUMMY. The CIS countries
started their transition process later than most Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs), their pace of reform is also slower than the CEECs.
3.2 A Bivariate Probit Model
Our model consists of two equations for regime determinations, one for official regimes
and another for de facto ones. We consider a general bivariate ordered choice model,
where both regimes have three choices: fixed, intermediate, or flexible regimes. Let Y
and Q be the indicators for official and de facto regimes, respectively. Each variable
takes the value of 0 for fixed regimes, 1 for intermediate regimes, and 2 for flexible
regimes. The classification of the official exchange rate regimes is based on the IMF’s
revised classification of 1999.
13 The classification of the de facto regimes is based on
our cluster analysis. Let Y* and Q* be two latent variables describing the optimal degree
of exchange rate regime flexibility for the official and the de facto regime, respectively.
Each latent variable is assumed to be a linear function of some exogenous variables X
and subject to a random disturbance. The two disturbances are assumed to follow a
standard bivariate normal distribution with covariance parameter ñ. They are assumed to
be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). To be specific,
Yit*  = X1itb1 + u1it, Yit =0 if Yit*￿0,      Y it=1 if  0<Yit*￿c 1,       Yit=2 if Yit*>c1     (1a)
Qit* = X2itb2 + u2it, Qit=0 if Qit*￿0,      Q it=1 if 0<Qit*￿c 2,       Qit=2 if Qit*>c2   (1b)
E[u1it] = E[u2it] = 0, Var[u1it] = Var[u2it] = 1, Cov[u1it,u2it]=r.                    (1c)
For each equation there are two thresholds separating the three regimes. The lower
thresholds are normalized to zero and the upper thresholds, c1 and c2, are strictly
positive. Altogether there are nine possible combinations between official and de facto10
exchange rate regimes. The parameters b1 and b2 and the thresholds can be estimated
using a maximum likelihood (ML) estimator.   
3.3 Empirical Results
To account for potential simultaneities, we instrumentalize all right-hand-side
variables (except the CIS dummy) by lagged values. We start with a broad specification
of the model including all explanatory variables mentioned above in both equations. We
drop geographical trade concentration, inflation, and the cumulative inflation differential
from the set of regressors, as they turn out to be non-significant. Table 6 presents two
estimates of a broad and a narrow specification that drops the remaining regressors of
very low significance. The likelihood-ratio test for jointly excluding the variables dropped
in specification (2) of the table is 5.94 with a marginal probability of 0.65.
A positive coefficient means that an increase in the corresponding variable raises
the probability of adopting a flexible regime. However, interpreting the estimated
coefficients is difficult, because the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on the
likelihood of choosing a particular regime depends on the value of the coefficient and on
the realization of the explanatory variable itself. To facilitate the interpretation, Table 6
also reports the marginal effects of a change in each explanatory variable on the
probability of choosing a fixed and an intermediate official exchange rate regime. These
marginal effects are measured by the first-order partial derivatives of the probabilities
with respect to the variable in question and evaluated at the sample mean of each
variables.
14 Since the marginal effects for all three regimes must sum to zero, the
marginal effect of each variable on the probability to adopt a flexible rate can be
obtained as minus the sum of the two marginal effects reported in Table 6.
Consider the determination of official regimes, first. The upper half of Table 6
suggests that the macroeconomic fundamentals considered by optimum currency area
theory provide some guidance of the choice of exchange rate regimes. Openness to
foreign trade increases the likelihood of adopting a fixed exchange rate regime.
Specifically, countries whose openness is 10 percent larger than the sample mean are
three percent more likely to adopt an official peg than the “average country.” We do not
find a significant impact of geographical concentration of trade as suggested by theory;
however, openness to the EU reinforces the effect of openness on the choice of official
regimes, and this variable may pick up some of the effect of trade concentration as well,
as the EU is the main trading partner for many of the countries in our group. An increase11
in openness to the EU by ten percent above the sample mean raises the likelihood of a
fixed-rate regime, after accounting for its non-linear effect, by a net of 14.8 percent. As
suggested by theory, a high degree of commodity concentration in foreign trade
increases the likelihood of adopting a flexible-rate regime. The table shows that an
increase in the commodity concentration of trade by 10 percent above the sample mean
leads to a decrease in the probability of a fixed rate regime by 14 percent and in the
probability of an intermediate regime by 11.2 percent, respectively. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, large countries in our sample are more likely to adopt a fixed rate,
while the CIS countries have a significant tendency to prefer flexible rates. The latter
result may be due to the fact that their main trade partner from the past, Russia, suffered
from severe monetary instability during the sample period, which made a peg to the
ruble unattractive.
As expected, financial sector development, measured by the ratio of broad
money to GDP, increases the likelihood of choosing a flexible exchange rate. The
availability of foreign exchange reserves clearly favors the adoption of a fixed rate or an
intermediate regime. Finally, the fiscal balance appears with a positive and significant
parameter. This implies that  a growing deficit (FISCAL < 0) is associated with a growing
likelihood of choosing a fixed-rate regime. An increase in the fiscal deficit relative to GDP
by one percent above the mean raises the likelihood of a fixed-rate regime by 2.55
percent and the likelihood of an intermediate regime by 2.03 percent. This may reflect
efforts to use the exchange rate constraint as a way to impose discipline on fiscal
authorities that might otherwise pressure the central bank into monetizing deficits and
creating inflation (Tornell and Velasco (2000)). We do not find a significant impact of
inflation or cumulative inflation differentials on the choice of the exchange rate regime,
suggesting that pegging the exchange rate to stabilize inflation did not play a large role
among our group of countries in the 1990s. These results are consistent with our
analysis in von Hagen and Zhou (2002). The model’s predictive performance is quite
satisfactory.
Turning to the model for the de-facto exchange rate regimes, we note, first, that
the traditional fundamentals, geographical concentration, openness, commodity trade
concentration, and financial sector development contribute little to the observed
choices. Only openness to the EU remains significant as before, suggesting that
countries trading a lot with the EU have a stronger tendency to adopt a de-facto peg.
Increasing trade openness to the EU by one percent above the sample mean raises the12
likelihood of a de-facto fixed rate by 1.6 percent. The reduced specification of the model
suggests that large countries in our sample have a stronger tendency to adopt a de-facto
float, a result that is in line with conventional international macroeconomic predictions. A
high degree of exchange rate pass-through raises the likelihood of a de-facto peg, which
is consistent with our priors. In contrast to its effect on official regimes, a growing fiscal
deficit raises the likelihood of adopting a more flexible de-facto regime.  An increase in
the budget deficit relative to GDP by one percent increases the likelihood of adopting a
de-facto float by 1.41 percent.
  Neither inflation nor cumulative inflation differentials have a significant impact on
the choice of the exchange rate regimes. Thus, combating inflation seems to have
played a much smaller role in the determination of these choices than conventional
wisdom suggests. Table 6 also reports the correlation between the error terms of the two
equations as r = 0.37 and statistically significant. This indicates that the two choices are
positively correlated and confirms that they should be analyzed jointly. Overall, the
predictive performance of the model seems quite satisfactory, as it “predicts” about two
thirds of the in-sample regime choices correctly for each regime separately, and about
half of joint choices of official and de-facto regimes.
4. A Model of Regime Discrepancies
4.1 A Univariate Probit Model for Regime Discrepancies
Although the bivariate probit model can explain the determination of both official
and de facto exchange rate regimes and, therefore, is able to predict regime
discrepancies implicitly, it does not allow us to investigate the quantitative influence of
the explanatory variables on the likelihood of regime discrepancies in a straightforward
way. For this purpose, we now derive a univariate probit model for regime discrepancies.
The difference between the indices for official and de facto exchange rate
regimes yields a direct measurement of regime discrepancies, Zit=Qit-Yit. By definition, Zit
is an integer between -2 and +2, with Zit=-2 indicating the strongest deviation towards de
facto pegging and Zit=2 the strongest deviation towards de facto floating. We adopt an
ordered choice probit model to explain the regime discrepancies measured by this index.
Let Zit* be a country’s latent variable indicating the desired degree of regime
discrepancy. When Zit* is very large, the country will  prefer a de facto regime far more
flexible than the official regime; while Zit* is very small, a de facto regime much more
rigid than the official regime will be adopted. For intermediate variables of Zit*, the de13
facto regime will be consistent with or deviate only slightly from the official one. This
leads us to five ordered choices of regime discrepancy:
Zit = -2  if Zit* £ 0,  Zit = -1 if 0 < Zit* £ d1, “fear of floating”
Zit =  0  if  d1 < Zit* £ d2, consistent  (2)
Zit = 1 if  d2 < Zit* £ d3,  Zit = 2 if Zit* > d3. “fear of pegging”
Here d1< d2< d3 are positive thresholds, and the lowest threshold is normalized to zero.
In the actual estimations presented below we combine the cases with Zit=1 and with
Zit=2 into one broader category, since the number of observations with Zit =2 is very
small. Thus, we need to estimate only the thresholds d1 and d2.
Given the model in (1a)-(1c), the latent variable for regime discrepancies is:
Zit*  = Qit* - Yit* = X2itb2 – X1itb1 + u2it – u1it = Xitb + uit,          (3)
where X contains all explanatory variables, â is the coefficient vector, and the composite
error term, u=u2-u1, is i.i.d. normal.
15 Based on the indication rule, it is straightforward to
formulate the likelihood function and estimate the parameters.
However, direct ML estimation of (3) is inefficient, since it does not fully exploit
the information contained in the observation of the official regime, Yit, about the error
term.  For example, if an official fixed-rate regime has been declared, Yit = 0, the de facto
regime can not be more rigid than the official one and Zit
* < d1 (Zit < 0) is excluded from
the set of possible regime discrepancies. Similarly, Zit
* > d2 (Zit > 0) is impossible, if the
official regime is already the most flexible one, Yit = 2. Thus, the conditional expectation
of E(Zit*|Xit, Yit) is different from the conditional expectation of E(Zit*|Xit), which would
otherwise be the basis for estimating the parameters â in equation (3). This is in turn due
to the fact that the conditional expectation of E(uit|Xit, Yit) = E(uit| Yit) = (r-1)E(u1it|Yit) „ 0.
For the last inequality, it can be shown (Maddala (1983)) that
E(u1it|Yit=0)=E(u1it|u1it￿-X 1itâ1) = -ö(-X1itâ1) / Ö(-X1itâ1), (4a)
E(u1it|Yit=1)=[ö(-X1itâ1)-ö(c1-X1itâ1)] / [Ö(c1-X1itâ1)-Ö(-X1itâ1)], (4b)
E(u1it|Yit=2)=E(u1it>c1-X1itâ1)=ö(c1-X1itâ1) / [1-Ö(c1-X1itâ1)]. (4c)14
Generally, the conditional expectations, E(u1it|Yit), will not be zero. They can be obtained
from an estimate of the parameters â1 and the likelihood function. Given (4a)--(4c), we
rewrite the model in equation (3) as follows
Zit*=Xitâ + (ñ-1)E(u1it|Yit) + åit, or equivalently,
Zit** = Zit*/ó = Xit (â/ó) + áÓj=0,1,2Djit E(u1it|Yit=j) + åit/ó. (5)
Here åit is a disturbance with conditional mean E(åit|Yit, Xit )=0 and a standard deviation
of ó. Dj is a dummy for official regime j, which takes a value of unity when official regime
j is adopted, and zero if not. The coefficient for Dj is á=(ñ-1)/ó. Note that the other
coeffcients are estimable only to an unknown proportionality.
To interpret equation (5), note that the conditional expectation E(u1it|Yit) is a
measure of the inappropriateness of the observed official exchange rate regime given
the realization of X1itâ1. To see this, assume that we observe X1itâ1 > c1. From equation
(1a), we should expect a floating-rate regime. Suppose that we observe an intermediate
regime, i.e., Yit = 1, instead. From (4b), we can infer that the random term u1it must be
sufficiently negative to induce this choice. If the observed official regime were a fixed-
rate one, Yit = 0, u1it must be even more negative than that. Thus, E(u1it|Yit) is a measure
of the discrepancy between the predicted official regime given the explanatory variables
contained in X1 and the observed official regime. In equation (5), á < 0 indicates that the
discrepancy between the actual and the official regime responds negatively to
discrepancy between the observed and the predicted official regime. Thus, if the
observed official regime is more flexible than the predicted one, E(u1it|Yit) > 0, we should
expect Zit
* < 0, i.e., the actual regime is more rigid than the observed official one. In other
words, “fear of floating” prevails, when a country officially adopts a flexible exchange
rate, although the explanatory variables contained in X1 indicate that a peg is the
appropriate regime. Thus, deviations of the de-facto from the official regime partially
correct the discrepancies between the observed and the predicted official regime. Such
a pattern would emerge if changes in the official regime are more costly from the point of
view of the policy maker than changes in the de-facto regime, and the latter is used to
react to temporary fluctuations in economic conditions or gradual changes in the
fundamentals determining the choice of the official regime. Such a pattern is consistent
with the findings reported in section 2, i.e., that official regimes change less frequently
and in larger steps and are more persistent than de facto regimes.15
4.2 Empirical Results
Table 7 reports our estimates of the ordered choice model for regime discrepancies.
Recall that a positive coefficient for a variable means that higher values of this variable
raise the probability of observing a case where the de facto regime is more flexible
relative to the official arrangement. As before, we report the marginal effects of a change
in each variable on the likelihood of observing cases of strong “fear of floating” (Z=-2),
intermediate “fear of floating” (Z=-1), and consistent regimes (Z=0). These marginal
effects are again calculated at the sample means of all explanatory variables. As before,
all right-hand-side variables except the CIS dummy are instrumentalized using past
values.
A first, important result from Table 7 is that the conditional expectation E(u1it|Yit)
appears with a strongly significant, negative coefficient. As discussed above, this
indicates that countries use their de-facto regimes to compensate, in part at least,
differences between the observed and the predicted official regime. The marginal effects
show that this influence on the de-facto regime choice is quite strong.
We find that openness pushes the regime discrepancy into the positive direction,
although the coefficient is only marginally significant. In contrast, the influence of trade
exposure to the EU is stronger and significant. Here, the marginal effects are particularly
telling. They indicate that increasing trade exposure with the EU pushes the “average”
country in the direction of a consistent regime. That is, countries with little trade with the
EU are more likely to exhibit “fear of floating.” Similar results hold for the effects of
economic size, measured in terms of GDP, and the availability of foreign exchange
reserves. The latter indicates that transition countries tend to adopt fixed exchange rates
and make their de facto regimes consistent with that if reserves are sufficiently available.
In contrast, rising commodity concentration of trade and a rising degree of exchange-
rate pass-through both increase the likelihood of finding cases of “fear of floating.”
The strongest impact on the likelihood of regime discrepancies comes from fiscal
deficits. Here we see that rising deficits (FISCAL < 0) strongly reduce the likelihood of
“fear of floating” and raise the likelihood of “fear of pegging” instead. This confirms our
earlier finding that countries move to a tighter official and a weaker de-facto exchange
rate constraint in the presence of large fiscal deficits. Finally, we now also find a
significant impact of the cumulative inflation differential. Specifically, large and rising16
cumulative inflation differentials induce countries to choose a more flexible exchange
rate policy than the one officially announced.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Several recent studies have pointed out that official and de facto exchange rate regimes
often differ in practice. While documenting these discrepancies, the existing studies do
not attempt to provide an empirical answer to the obvious question, why countries
choose different official and de facto regimes. This is the purpose of the current paper.
We have presented an empirical study of the choices of official and de facto exchange
rate regimes of 25 transition countries during the 1990s. We have shown, first, that
regime discrepancies are frequent among these countries. Furthermore, official regimes
are more persistent and change in less frequent but larger steps than de facto regimes.
This is consistent with the notion that official regime changes carry a fixed cost that
exceeds the cost of changing the de facto regime, and that countries use the latter as a
policy instrument to adjust their exchange rate policy to macro economic developments
earlier and faster than they respond with their official regime.
  Our empirical analysis has presented a bivariate discrete-choice model for the
official and the de-facto exchange rate regime. Official regime choices seem to be
guided significantly by the conventional wisdom of international macro economics. Thus,
we find that more open countries are more likely to adopt more rigid exchange rate
regimes, countries with a high degree of commodity concentration in international trade
are less likely to do so, and countries more strongly exposed to trade with the EU are
also more likely to choose a peg as the official regime. In addition, we find that countries
with more developed monetary systems are more likely to adopt an official floating-rate
regime. Increasing availability of foreign exchange reserves and increasing fiscal deficits
both raise the likelihood of adopting an exchange rate peg. The latter suggests that
monetary authorities tried to impose some discipline on fiscal policies by subjecting
themselves to the constraint of a fixed exchange rate.
The choice of de-facto regimes, in contrast, seems to be much less guided by
macro economic fundamentals such as openness and the commodity structure of
international trade. As before, we find that trade exposure to the EU increases the
likelihood of choosing a peg. We also find that large countries are more likely to choose
a de-facto float than small countries. There is a stark difference, however, in the impact
of fiscal deficits between official and de-facto regime choices. Rising fiscal deficits17
strongly push the choice of the de-facto regime towards a more flexible one. Combined
with the earlier result for official regimes, this means that countries with large fiscal
deficits are likely to exhibit strong “fear of pegging”, i.e., a more flexible de facto regime
than the official one.
Next, we develop a discrete choice model of regime discrepancies to explain
deviations between the official and the de-facto regimes more directly. A first result of
interest here is that regime discrepancies respond to the inappropriateness of the
observed official regime. Specifically, if a country’s official regime is too rigid as
suggested by our discrete choice model, its de-facto regime is likely to be more flexible
than its official one. Conversely, if a country’s official regime is too flexible, its de facto
regime is likely to be more rigid than the official one. Thus, the widespread observation
of “fear of floating,” where countries adopt de-facto pegs although they declare
themselves officially to have floating exchange rates, reflects cases where the
underlying fundamentals contained in our model favor a more rigid exchange rate
regime than that actually adopted. Such a pattern could arise, if the underlying
fundamentals gradually develop in a way favoring fixed exchange rates, or if countries
preferring exchange rate pegs are reluctant to declare official pegs because of
reputational constraints and the fear of being exposed to speculative attacks.18
Table 6: Bivariate Ordered Probit Model for the Joint Determination of Official and
De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) (2) Marginal Effects
Variables   Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-Ratio Fixed Intermediate
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Official Regimes
OPENNESS -1.49  -3.16 -1.41 -3.02  0.30  0.24
OPENTOEU -7.95 -1.74 -8.24 -2.25  1.76  1.41
OPENTOEU
2 12.47  2.64 13.00  3.23 -2.78 -2.22
GDP -0.38 -2.92   -0.39 -2.94  0.08  0.07
COMCON        5.95  2.39   6.54  3.08 -1.40 -1.12
MONEY         2.66  3.24   2.71  3.43 -0.58 -0.46
PASSTHRU -0.95 -1.09
RESERVE      -1.56  -3.98  -1.57 -4.07   0.34  0.27
FISCAL 11.30  2.61 11.91  2.89 -2.55 -2.03
GDPGROWTH   1.81  0.71
CISDUMMY       2.40   3.52   2.33  3.61 -0.43 -0.27
Constant   0.16  0.08  -0.20 -0.16
Upper Threshold   0.85  5.91   0.84  5.93
De Facto Regimes
OPENNESS -0.56 -1.40
OPENTOEU  -2.45 -0.86 -4.67 -2.01  1.63 -0.78
OPENTOEU
2  3.53  1.27  4.91  1.88 -1.72  0.82
GDP  0.12  1.28  0.23  3.01 -0.08  0.04
COMCON -1.06 -0.74
MONEY  0.82  1.02
PASSTHRU -1.39 -1.78 -1.31 -1.74  0.46 -0.22
RESERVE -0.11 -0.63
FISCAL -4.47 -1.29 -7.69 -2.98  2.69 -1.28
GDPGROWTH -0.33 -0.16
CISDUMMY  0.74  1.30
Constant -0.21 -0.22 -0.38 -0.87
Upper Threshold  0.76  6.06  0.74  6.07
ñ           0.37  2.59   0.37  2.64
Observations    154  154  
Log-likelihood    -215.70   -218.67
Correct pred.
Official (%)   70.1  70.8
De facto (%)   64.9  63.6
Joint (%)      47.4  43.5
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.19
Table 7: Determination of Regime Discrepancies
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Marginal effects for Z=
Variables    Coeff. t-Ratio Coeff. t-ratio  -2 -1 0   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E(u1it|Yit) -1.14 -7.13 -1.14  -7.18  0.33  0.11 -0.42
       
OPENNESS       0.58  1.56  0.55   1.52 -0.16 -0.05  0.20
OPENTOEU    2.67  0.95      2.66   0.95 -0.76 -0.26  0.98
OPENTOEU
2    -4.47 -1.61 -4.49  -1.61  1.29  0.43 -1.65
COMCON        -4.27 -2.98 -4.31  -3.01  1.24  0.42 -1.59
GDP   0.27  2.91  0.27   2.91 -0.08 -0.03  0.10
PASSTHRU      -0.98 -1.37 -0.99  -1.40  0.28  0.10 -0.37
MONEY         -0.87 -1.18 -0.90  -1.22  0.26  0.09 -0.33
RESERVE        0.92  4.68  0.93   4.75 -0.27 -0.09  0.34
FISCAL       -15.06 -4.36    -14.83  -4.45  4.46  1.44 -5.47
INFLATION     -0.33 -0.50
CUMINF   0.20  1.90  0.17   1.90 -0.05 -0.02  0.06
GDPGROWTH  -0.79 -0.30
CISDUMMY      -1.83 -3.34 -1.83  -3.35  0.55  0.05 -0.56
CONSTANT   1.88   1.81  1.85   1.78
Threshold2   1.09   7.81  1.08   7.19
Threshold3   3.38 10.76  3.36 10.86
Observations        154   154
Log-likelihood     -136.2 -136.3
Correct pred. (%)   58.4  58.4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
The dependent variable is Z=Q-Y, where Q (Y) is the code for the de facto (official)
exchange rate regimes. Each code takes the value of 0, 1, or 2 for fixed, intermediate, or
flexible regimes, respectively.20
 Appendix I: 
Cluster Analysis for the Classification of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes
AI.1. Volatility Measures
We choose three volatility measures as relevant for the regime classification: volatility of
exchange rates, volatility of exchange rate changes, and volatility of reserves. Volatility
of exchange rates, ó(e), is defined as the average of the absolute monthly percentage
changes in the reference exchange rate during a calendar year. The reference exchange
rate is the nominal exchange rate of the home currency vis-à-vis the reference currency
or currencies. If the home currency is officially pegged to a single foreign currency, such
foreign currency is regarded as the reference currency. In case of composite currency
peg, the changes in the reference exchange rate is the weighted average of the changes
in each component exchange rates. In case of horizontal bands, crawling pegs, or
crawling bands, the reference exchange rates are defined in a similar way. In other
cases the reference exchange rates are simply the nominal exchange rates against US
dollar. Volatility of exchange rate changes, ó(Äe), is defined as the standard deviation of
the monthly percentage changes in the reference exchange rates. Volatility of reserves,
ó(r), is defined as the average of the absolute monthly changes in the non-gold
international reserves (in US dollar), divided by the monetary base in the previous month
(also in US dollar).
Data on the monthly exchange rates of the currencies of the transition countries
vis-à-vis US dollar are extracted from the UNECE database kindly provided by Charles
Wyplosz. The monthly exchange rates among US dollar and other reference currencies,
as well as data on non-gold international reserves and on monetary base, are extracted
from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.
AI.2. Defining Features of Regime Groups
The defining features of each de facto regimes are summarized in the following table.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regime Groups   ó(e)    ó(Äe)  ó(r)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fixed Regimes  low     low     high
Intermediate Regimes medium  medium  medium
Flexible Regimes high    high    low
Inconclusive Regimes low     low     low
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AI.3. Procedures of the Cluster Analysis
The whole procedure consists of five main sections: normalization of data, elimination of
outliers, nearest centroid sorting, further rounds of sorting, and classification of outliers.
(I)  Normalization of Data
The data is normalized by subtracting from each volatility measure the mean of this
variable and then dividing the result by the standard deviation of this variable. The mean
and standard deviation of each volatility variable are computed using pooled
observations from all countries and over all available time periods.
(II) Elimination of Outliers21
Two observations with the highest ó(e) as well as two with the lowest ó(e) are first
eliminated as outliers. Another 4 outliers are eliminated based on ó(Äe) in the same
way. Finally yet another 4 outliers are singled out based on ó(r). All together 12 outliers
are eliminated from the data set. The remaining data points are subject to cluster
analysis.
(III) Nearest Centroid Sorting
16
We adopt MacQueen's k-means method for data sorting. Here we set k equal to four.
The algorithm for sorting m data units into k clusters is composed of the following steps:
1. Choose k data units in the data set randomly as clusters of one member each.
2. Assign each of the remaining m - k data units to the cluster with the nearest centroid.
After each assignment, re-compute the centroid of the gaining cluster.
3. After all data units have been assigned in step (2), take the existing cluster centroids
as fixed seed points and make one more pass through the data set assigning each data
unit to the nearest seed point.
4. Label each cluster according to the features listed in the above table.
(IV)  Further Rounds of Sorting
For the data units classified as “inconclusive” in the previous round, re-normalize these
data units, and repeat the steps in section (III) until the number of inconclusive regimes
is reduced to less than 10% of m.
17
(V)  Classification of Outliers
Combine the results from the previous two sections and compute the centroids for each
cluster. Assign the outliers to the cluster with the nearest centroid.
AI.4. Classification of the Additional Data
The additional data have observations only on exchange rates, so the volatility of
reserves is not available. Based on the volatility of exchange rates and the volatility of
exchange rate changes, each observation is assigned to the cluster with the shortest
distance between the data point and the two-dimensional cluster centroid. This
completes the classification procedures.22
Appendix II:  Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition Economies
Table A-1: The IMF Classification of Official Exchange Rate Regimes
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 1991  1992  1993  1994  1995   1996  1997   1998  1999
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Albania          3 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Armenia          na na (3) (8) 8 8 8 8 8 8
Azerbaijan      na na (3) (3) 8 8 8 8 7 7
Belarus          na na (3) (3) (7) 7 4 7 7 7
Bulgaria         3 8 8 8 8 8 8 2 2 2
Croatia          na na 3 8 4 4 4 4 4 7
Czech Rep.    3 3 3 3 3 3 4 7 7 7
Estonia          na na 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Georgia          na na (3) (8) 7 7 7 3 8 8
Hungary          3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6
Kazakhstan    na na (3) (8) 8 8 8 7 7 8
Kyrgyz Rep.    na na (3) (8) 8 7 7 7 7 7
Latvia           na na (8) (8) 3 3 3 3 3 3
Lithuania        na na (8) (8) 2 2 2 2 2 2
Macedonia      na na 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3
Moldova          na na (3) (8) 8 8 8 8 8 8
Poland           3 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6
Romania         3 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7
Russia           na na (3) (8) 8 4 6 6 7 8
Slovak Rep.    na na na 3 3 3 4 4 7 7
Slovenia         na (7) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Tajikistan       na na na (3) (3) 8 8 8 7 7
Turkmenistan na na (3) (3) 3 7 7 3 3 3
Ukraine          na na (3) (8) 8 7 7 4 4 7
Uzbekistan     na na (3) (3) (8) 7 7 7 7 7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: End-year observations. Codes in parentheses refer to the periods when the newly-
introduced national currencies have not yet assumed the status as the sole legal tender. The
meanings of the codes are: na=not available, 1=currency union (no separate legal tender),
2=currency board arrangements, 3=conventionally fixed pegs (adjustable pegs, de facto pegs),
4=horizontal bands, 5=crawling pegs, 6=crawling bands, 7=managed floating without
preannounced path for the exchange rate, 8=independent floating.23
Table A-2: De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Albania          (1) (3) (3) (1) (1) 2 3 3 2 3
Armenia          na na (3) 3 3 1 1 1 1 1
Azerbaijan      na na na (2) (3) 1 1 1 0 1
Belarus          na na (3) (3) (3) 1 2 3 3 1
Bulgaria         na (1) (1) (2) 1 1 3 2 1 1
Croatia          (1) (3) (3) 2 1 1 0 2 1 1
Czech Rep.    (2) (1) (1) 1 0 1 0 2 2 3
Estonia          na na 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
Georgia          na na na (2) (3) (1) 1 1 2 1
Hungary          2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kazakhstan    na na na na 2 1 1 1 1 1
Kyrgyz Rep.    na na na (2) (2) 1 2 1 3 1
Latvia           na na (2) 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Lithuania        na na (3) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Macedonia      na na na na 1 1 1 2 1 1
Moldova          na na 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Poland           1 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 2
Romania         (3) 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2
Russia           na na (3) (2) (2) 2 1 1 3 2
Slovak Rep.    na na na 2 1 1 0 1 1 2
Slovenia         na na 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
Tajikistan       na na (2) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (3)
Turkmenistan na na na na (3) (3) (3) (1) (2) (1)
Ukraine          na na na 3 3 1 1 0 3 2
Uzbekistan     na na na na (3) (1) (2) (1) (1) (2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Codes without parentheses are de facto regimes classified by the cluster analysis
methodology based on three volatility variables. Codes in parentheses are de facto regimes
classified solely based on the behavior of the exchange rates without data on the reserves
changes. The meanings of the codes are: na=not available, 0=inconclusive observations, 1=fixed
regimes, 2=intermediate regimes, 3=flexible regimes.24
Appendix III: Definitions of Variables and Data Sources
CISDUMMY: Dummy for the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, including Armenia, Azebaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
COMCON: Commodity concentration of foreign trade, measured by the Gini-Hirschman
coefficient defined below. Commodities are first defined at the one-digit SITC level (0-9)
to create ten broad groups and then reclassified into seven main commodity categories.
Denoting exports of commodity i from country j by Xij and country j's total export by Xj,
the Gini-Hirschman coefficient for country j, Cj, is defined as Cj =￿{￿ i(Xij/Xj)
2}. Data on
commodity trade are from International Trade Center.
FISCAL: General government budget balance, normalized by GDP. A positive (negative)
entry denotes a surplus (deficit). Data source is IMF, International Financial Statistics
(various issues), and EBRD, Transition Report (1999).
GDP: Gross domestic products in current prices, in billions of US dollars and then in
logarithms. Data are from IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2000.
INFLATION: Change in the consumer prices, annual average, transformed using the
formula x* = x/(1+x). Data source is IMF, International Financial Statistics (various
issues).
MONEY: Broad money, normalized by GDP. Broad money is the sum of “money” and
“quasi-money”. Data source is IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues).
OPENNESS: Degree of openness to foreign economies, measured by the ratio of total
trade volume to GDP. Total trade volume is the sum of goods export (f.o.b.) and goods
import (c.i.f.). Trade data are from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (various issues).
GDP data are from IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2000.
OPENTOEU: Degree of openness to the EU, measured by the share of trade with the
EU in total trade. Data source is IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (various issues).
PASSTHRU: Pass-through effects from exchange rate depreciation to inflation,
measured by the correlation coefficient between one-quarter lagged monthly
depreciation rates and current monthly inflation rates. Data source is IMF, International
Financial Statistics (various issues).
RESERVE: Ratio of non-gold international reserves to broad money. Data sources are
IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues), Country Report (various issues),
and EBRD, Transition Report (1999).25
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Endnotes
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† ZEI, University of Bonn, Indiana University, and CEPR.
‡ ZEI, University of Bonn.
1 See, among others, Heller (1978), Holden et al. (1979), Dreyer (1978), Melvin (1985), Savvides
(1990), Edwards (1996), Bernhard and Leblang (1999), and Poirson (2001).
2 Holden et al. (1979) and Poirson (2001) construct empirical indices of exchange rate variability
and regress them on a set of explanatory variables.
3 The three transition economies included in the sample are Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania.
4 The “inconclusive” regime refers to the cluster with low volatilities on both exchange rates and
reserves. This could reflect a fixed policy regime in operation or just the absence of shocks to the
foreign exchange market. For the subsequent comparisons with official regimes, these cases
subsumed under fixed rate regimes, as both exhibit low volatility in the exchange rates.
5 We also classify de facto regimes based on just two measures: volatility of exchange rates and
volatility of international reserves. The results fail to classify some observations with currency
boards as either fixed or inconclusive regimes. The classification based on three volatility
measures are free of this problem and will be used in the following analysis.
6 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) use this term for countries that did not report a fixed rate
as the official regime, although in practice their  policy closely resembled a currency peg. Since
this implies that the official label looks more flexible than the de facto regime, it is essentially the
same as fear of floating. We reserve the term  “fear of pegging” for cases where de facto regime
is more flexible than the official one.
7 Based on a Chi-square test, the null hypothesis of stationarity is rejected at the 5% significance
level for the official regime classification, but can not be rejected at 10% level for the de facto
regime classification.
8 Note that the transition out of an existing regime discrepancy usually leads to consistency
between official and de facto regimes. The probability of moving from a case of fear of floating to
a case of fear of pegging is one percent, while the probability for a transition in the opposite
direction is 20 percent.
9 See Appendix III for a detailed data description.
10 Except for OPENTOEU, these variables are all standard in the empirical literature. See, among
others, Dreyer (1978), Melvin (1985), Savvides (1990), and Poirson (2001).
11 In order to dampen the impact of some hyperinflationary episodes on the estimation, we follow
Gosh et al. (1997) and transform the inflation rate (x) by x/(1+x).
12 Edwards (1996) and Poirson (2001) find strong evidence that reserve sufficiency increases the
likelihood for fixed exchange rates being adopted. Meese and Rose (1998) also report some
indirect evidence to this effect. Rizzo (1998) and Berger et al. (2000), however, provide some
counter evidence.
13 Data on official exchange rate regimes are from the following sources: IMF, International
Financial Statistics (various issues), Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions Annual
Report (1998), and Exchange Rate Arrangements and Currency Convertibility: Developments
and Issues (1999). For the years before 1998, we have updated the official classifications using
the IMF criteria and national and IMF data sources. Currency boards and conventional fixed pegs
are included in fixed rate regimes, horizontal bands, crawling pegs and crawling bands in
intermediate regimes, and managed and free floats in flexible rate regimes.
14 The marginal effects of the CIS dummy are measured as changes in the relevant probability
when the dummy switches from zero to unity.
15 From (1c) it can be shown that the unconditional variance of u is 2(1-ñ).)
16 See Anderberg (1973, pp. 162).
17 The 10% threshold is an arbitrary criterion.2008
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